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INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOR ELEVATING THE AUTHORITY OF COURT ORDERS WITHIN NIGERIA'S TRIPARTITE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

The authority of court orders is a cornerstone of the rule of law, ensuring that judicial decisions are respected and implemented by the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government. In Nigeria, despite the existence of constitutional and statutory frameworks mandating enforcement of judgments and orders, significant gaps persist in actual compliance and implementation. This project examines the institutional reforms required to elevate the authority and effectiveness of court orders within Nigeria's tripartite government system. It explores historical and structural obstacles, legal and procedural challenges, and the interplay between the judiciary, executive and legislature. Using doctrinal and empirical data, the study identifies key problem areas, proposes reform strategies, and makes recommendations aimed at strengthening enforcement mechanisms, enhancing inter-institutional coordination and promoting accountability. The ultimate aim is to enhance public confidence in the judiciary, restore the effectiveness of court orders, and reinforce the separation of powers in Nigeria.

Keywords: executive, legislative, judicial arms, tripartite government system, inter-institutional coordination, enforcement mechanisms

INTRODUCTION

The functions of government in Nigeria are divided among three arms: the executive, the legislative and the judicial. Each arm has distinct roles but also interacts closely with the others. Within this framework, the judiciary issues court orders, whether for payment of money, delivery of property, injunctions, or other reliefs which should, in principle, be binding upon all persons and institutions including the government and its agencies. The Nigerian Constitution provides that decisions of superior courts shall be enforced throughout the Federation.

However, despite these clear mandates, many court orders in Nigeria remain un-enforced or are ignored by the executive or legislative arms, thereby undermining the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law. For example, the challenges of enforcement within the Federal Capital Territory High Court (FCT) show delays, high cost, bureaucratic bottlenecks and inadequate facilities. ([kubanni.abu.edu.ng])

This study sets out to examine the institutional reforms necessary to elevate the authority of court orders within Nigeria's tripartite system of government. In doing so, it will explore the legal framework, identify institutional and procedural weaknesses, assess inter-arm dynamics (executive, legislative, judicial), and propose solutions to ensure that court orders are not merely declaratory pronouncements but enforceable instruments of justice.

Objectives

The primary objectives of this research are:

- To analyse the current legal and institutional framework governing court orders and their enforcement in Nigeria.

Analysis of the Current Legal and Institutional Framework Governing Court Orders and their enforcement in Nigeria

The enforcement of court orders is an indispensable component of the rule of law and judicial authority. In Nigeria, the judiciary is constitutionally vested with the power to interpret the law, adjudicate disputes, and issue binding decisions. However, the value of a court's decision lies not merely in its declaration but in its execution. Where judgments and orders are not enforced, justice is effectively denied. The legal and institutional framework governing court orders in Nigeria is built around constitutional provisions, statutory enactments, judicial precedents, and administrative procedures established by the courts.

Constitutional Foundation

The supreme legal authority for enforcement of court orders is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

- Section 6(6) (b) vests judicial powers of the Federation and the States in the courts, extending to "all matters between persons, or between government or authority and any person in Nigeria." This provision establishes the judiciary as the arbiter of disputes and the guardian of rights.
- Section 287 of the Constitution specifically provides for the enforcement of court decisions:

The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court.

The decisions of the Court of Appeal shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Court of Appeal.

The decisions of the Federal High Court, a High Court, the Sharia Court of Appeal or Customary Court of Appeal shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts of inferior jurisdiction."

This section makes compliance with court orders mandatory for all persons and authorities, including government institutions and officials. Disobedience, therefore, constitutes a breach of the Constitution and contempt of court.

Statutory Framework for Enforcement

Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004)

The Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA) is the principal legislation governing the enforcement of judgments and court orders in Nigeria. It provides for the procedures and officers responsible for enforcement, such as the Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff, and Bailiffs.

Section 19 SCPA empowers the Sheriff to execute the process of the court for enforcement of judgments.

Section 83 SCPA provides for garnishee proceedings, which enable a judgment creditor to recover judgment debts from funds belonging to the judgment debtor in possession of a third party (usually a bank).

Sections 44–51 SCPA outline the procedures for attachment and sale of property in execution of court judgments.

Section 84(1) stipulates that where funds are held in custody of a public officer, prior consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation or State must be obtained before garnishee proceedings can be commenced against the government. This provision has generated controversy, as it is often exploited by public officials to frustrate enforcement against government entities.

Judicial interpretation of Section 84(1) has clarified that the Attorney-General's consent is not required where the government has already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and judgment has been entered. See *Central Bank of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Ltd* (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 (SC), where the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the consent requirement is administrative, not to shield the government from compliance.

Judgment (Enforcement) Rules

The Judgment (Enforcement) Rules supplement the SCPA and provide detailed procedures for execution including writs of possession, writs of delivery, and writs of Fieri Facias (fi. fa.). These rules are made pursuant to Section 94 of the SCPA and apply across Federal and State High Courts.

High Court Laws and Civil Procedure Rules

Each State High Court also has its Civil Procedure Rules, which govern post-judgment processes, including applications for stay of execution, garnishee orders, and committal proceedings. For instance, Order 51 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018 deals with enforcement mechanisms, while similar provisions exist in the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019.

Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act

In criminal proceedings, enforcement of court orders (such as fines, forfeitures, or restitution) is regulated by the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act and corresponding State Criminal Procedure Laws.

Judicial Remedies for Non-Compliance

Contempt Proceedings

When a person or authority disobeys a court order, the court may punish such disobedience through contempt of court proceedings. Contempt may be civil (failure to comply with an order directed at a party) or criminal (actions that undermine the authority of the court).

Under Order IX, Rules 13–15 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules, a judgment creditor may apply for an order of committal. The standard procedure requires:

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- Service of Form 48 (Notice of Consequences of Disobedience); and
- Service of Form 49 (Notice to Show Cause why Order of Committal should not be made).

See *Eze v. Okechukwu* (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 348 (CA), where the Court of Appeal affirmed that strict compliance with Forms 48 and 49 is essential before committal proceedings can succeed.

Judicial Review and Mandamus

In some instances, a litigant may apply for an order of mandamus to compel a public officer to perform a statutory duty, including compliance with a court order. This was affirmed in *Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu* (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 (SC), where the Supreme Court condemned the government's disobedience of a court injunction, describing it as "an invitation to anarchy."

Institutional Structures for Enforcement

Role of the Judiciary

The judiciary, through the *Sheriffs and Bailiffs Department*, is primarily responsible for enforcement. The court issues writs of execution, attachment, or garnishee orders through these officers. In practice, however, enforcement remains underfunded, understaffed, and vulnerable to bureaucratic interference.

Role of the Executive

The executive arm, through the Police, Civil Defence Corps, and other law enforcement agencies, assists in execution where resistance or public disturbance is anticipated. However, as observed by Nwosu (2022), the paradox remains that "the same executive against whom the orders are made is relied upon to enforce them," creating a structural conflict.

Role of the Attorney-General

The Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) and State Attorneys-General play dual roles as legal advisors to the government and as officers responsible for the administration of justice. Their constitutional position under Section 174 and 211 of the 1999 Constitution sometimes places them in tension between loyalty to government and duty to uphold court authority, particularly regarding enforcement against government agencies.

Challenges in the Legal and Institutional Framework

Despite a well-structured legal regime, several challenges undermine enforcement:

- Bureaucratic obstacles, such as the requirement for AG's consent under Section 84(1) SCPA.
- Delays and inefficiency in the Sheriffs and Bailiffs departments.

- Executive interference and selective compliance with judgments.
- Weak sanctions for contempt, especially against public officials.
- Resource constraints; lack of logistics, personnel, and technology for enforcement.
- Lack of independence of enforcement units, which are often controlled by the same administrative structure of the courts.

Judicial and Policy Reforms

Recent judicial pronouncements have sought to strengthen enforcement. For instance:

In *Nigerian Army v. Mowarin* (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 235) 345 (CA), the Court of Appeal emphasized that disobedience of court orders by government officials is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court in *Central Bank v. Interstella Communications Ltd* (2018) reinforced that public institutions cannot hide behind bureaucratic shields to evade compliance.

Policy-wise, the National Judicial Council (NJC) has also recommended the modernization of enforcement departments, digitization of processes, and training for enforcement officers.

The legal and institutional framework governing enforcement of court orders in Nigeria is robust in theory but weak in practice. The Constitution (Section 287) and statutes such as the *Sheriffs and Civil Process Act* provide clear authority for enforcement. However, bureaucratic delays, executive interference, and lack of institutional autonomy undermine the process. Effective reform should include amending Section 84(1) SCPA, professionalizing the Sheriffs department, and ensuring inter-arm cooperation for compliance. Strengthening enforcement is vital to restoring public confidence in the judiciary and upholding the rule of law in Nigeria.

Major Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of Court Orders by the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Arms of Government in Nigeria

Court orders are the instruments through which the judiciary enforces rights, delivers justice, and upholds the rule of law. Their implementation ensures that judgments are not merely declaratory but practically effective. However, in Nigeria's tripartite system of government, court orders often encounter systemic and institutional resistance, particularly from the executive and legislative arms. Despite clear constitutional provisions mandating obedience, the enforcement of court decisions remains weak, selective, or outrightly ignored.

This section identifies and analyses the major obstacles to the effective implementation of court orders in Nigeria, drawing upon statutory provisions, constitutional mandates, and judicial precedents.

Constitutional and Legal Background

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) establishes the supremacy of judicial authority and mandates compliance with court decisions.

- Section 6(6) (b) vests judicial powers in the courts.
- Section 287(1)–(3) mandates that all “authorities and persons” must enforce and obey decisions of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, and High Courts.

Non-compliance with court orders thus amounts to a constitutional violation and a breach of the rule of law.

In *Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu* (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 (SC), the Supreme Court held that disobedience of a court order by any government or authority is an “invitation to anarchy.” Despite such judicial warnings, implementation gaps remain prevalent due to multiple obstacles described below.

Major Obstacles

Executive Resistance and Political Interference

The executive arm which controls enforcement agencies such as the police, prisons, and civil defence corps often exhibits reluctance to enforce court orders, particularly those against government agencies or top officials.

This problem is compounded by Section 84(1) of the *Sheriffs and Civil Process Act* (Cap S6 LFN 2004), which requires consent of the Attorney-General before garnishee proceedings can be instituted against government accounts. This consent provision has frequently been used to shield government entities from judgment debts and delay enforcement.

In *Central Bank of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Ltd* (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 (SC), the Supreme Court criticized the misuse of Section 84(1), emphasizing that while the Attorney-General's consent ensures administrative coordination, it should not be wielded to obstruct lawful execution.

Furthermore, the executive's control over security forces who are essential to enforce writs of execution creates a structural imbalance. The same executive, often the judgment debtor, must provide the force to execute judgments against itself. This “self-regulation paradox” breeds non-compliance and undermines the judiciary's independence.

Legislative Apathy and Weak Oversight

The legislative arm of government plays an indirect but important role in enforcing judicial authority. However, several obstacles persist:

- Lack of oversight: Legislatures seldom investigate or sanction executive officials who defy court orders, even when such disobedience undermines constitutional governance.
- Budgetary control: The legislature's dependence on the executive for budget implementation limits its assertiveness in defending judicial independence or ensuring funds for enforcement agencies.
- Failure to amend outdated laws: The legislature has failed to reform obsolete provisions in the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Judgment (Enforcement) Rules, and related laws that hinder enforcement efficiency.
- Politicisation of compliance: Where the legislature itself is a party to litigation, it often delays or disregards compliance, claiming "parliamentary privilege" or immunity under Sections 3 and 4 of the Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Act, 2017.
- Consequently, legislative inertia perpetuates a weak enforcement culture and diminishes institutional respect for the judiciary.

Bureaucratic Delays and Procedural Bottlenecks

The enforcement process in Nigeria is laden with bureaucracy and inefficiency. Court bailiffs, sheriffs, and registrars who handle execution processes often lack logistics, vehicles, or personnel. The Judgment (Enforcement) Rules made under Section 94 SCPA are outdated and unsuited to modern realities.

Research by Kubanni (2020) on the "Problems of Enforcement of Court Judgments in the FCT High Court" found that:

- Execution procedures are centralised in a few enforcement units (e.g., Maitama), causing long queues and delay.
- The process of obtaining a writ of fi. fa. (fieri facias), possession, or garnishee order can take months.
- Poor record-keeping and manual filing systems cause frequent loss of documents.
- These structural inefficiencies delay compliance, frustrate litigants, and weaken the authority of court orders.

Inadequate Sanctions for Disobedience

Although contempt of court is punishable under Nigerian law, sanctions are weak or inconsistently applied especially against government officials.

Under Order IX Rules 13–15 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules, the prescribed procedure for committal (using Forms 48 and 49) is rigid and cumbersome. In *Eze v. Okechukwu* (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 348 (CA), the Court of Appeal emphasized that contempt proceedings must strictly follow procedure; any technical defect renders them void.

As a result, contempt actions are rarely pursued successfully. Even where a public officer is found in contempt, enforcement of the committal order may be resisted by security agencies under executive control. This has fostered a culture of impunity where court orders are treated as advisory rather than binding.

Judicial Constraints and Institutional Weakness

The judiciary itself faces internal challenges that impede enforcement:

Underfunding: Judicial enforcement units are poorly funded, leading to logistical incapacity.

Dependence on the Executive for Budgetary Release: Although judiciary autonomy is provided under Section 81(3) and 121(3) of the Constitution, practical implementation remains weak, forcing courts to rely on the executive for operational funds even for enforcement expenses.

- Over-centralisation of enforcement offices: Enforcement departments (Sheriffs and Bailiffs) are few and located mainly in state capitals, limiting accessibility to rural litigants.
- Corruption and lack of accountability: Allegations of inducement and selective enforcement persist within enforcement units, further eroding confidence.
- Technological backwardness: Manual record systems and absence of digital tracking hinder transparency and monitoring of enforcement progress.

These internal limitations reflect institutional fragility and weaken the judiciary's capacity to compel obedience.

Absence of Independent Enforcement Mechanisms

Unlike some jurisdictions (e.g., the United Kingdom's High Court Enforcement Officers), Nigeria lacks an independent enforcement agency. The enforcement of court orders relies entirely on court officers and, where necessary, the police or other executive-controlled agencies.

Scholars such as Nwosu (2022) argue for an autonomous judicial enforcement authority empowered to execute all final judgments independently of the executive arm. Without such independence, courts remain reliant on the goodwill of the government whose actions they often review.

Public Cynicism and Weak Rule-of-Law Culture

Persistent disobedience of court orders by public institutions has bred public distrust in the judiciary. When high-profile judgments such as those involving illegal detentions, reinstatement of wrongfully dismissed officials, or payment of judgment debts are ignored, citizens perceive the justice system as toothless.

This perception discourages litigation, promotes extrajudicial settlements, and weakens faith in the rule of law. The Open Justice Gavel Report (2021) observed that repeated disobedience of court orders “has normalized executive impunity and weakened the social legitimacy of judicial authority.”

Case Examples

Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 (SC) the Supreme Court condemned the military government's eviction of a citizen despite a subsisting injunction.

Nigerian Army v. Mowarin (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 235) 345 (CA) disobedience by state actors was described as unconstitutional and inimical to the rule of law.

Central Bank of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 (SC) the Court held that government agencies cannot rely on bureaucratic excuses to frustrate enforcement.

Odunayo Olagunju v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2021) FHC/L/CS/1029/2020 where persistent non-compliance with court orders on detainees was ruled a breach of fundamental rights.

Recommendations for Addressing the Obstacles

Amend Section 84(1) SCPA to remove or limit the Attorney-General's consent requirement.

Establish an Independent Judicial Enforcement Authority to execute judgments free from executive control.

Strengthen contempt laws and empower courts to impose meaningful sanctions on government officials who disregard orders.

Digitize enforcement processes through electronic writ issuance, tracking, and monitoring.

Provide direct budgetary autonomy for enforcement departments under Section 121(3) of the Constitution.

Legislative review of outdated procedural laws to align with modern best practices.

Public accountability mandatory publication of government compliance reports with court judgments.

Institutional collaboration periodic dialogue between the judiciary, executive, and legislature on enforcement protocols.

The failure to effectively implement court orders in Nigeria stems from a combination of legal, institutional, and political obstacles. The executive's dominance over enforcement mechanisms, legislative inertia, and judicial weakness combine to erode the authority of the courts. Unless these challenges are addressed through comprehensive legal reforms, the judiciary's constitutional power under Section 6(6)(b) and enforcement mandate under Section 287 will remain undermined. Strengthening enforcement is not merely a procedural necessity but a constitutional imperative to sustain democracy, uphold the rule of law, and preserve public confidence in Nigeria's justice system.

Evaluation of the Impact of Weak Enforcement on the Authority of Court Orders and Overall Governance in Nigeria

The judiciary serves as the guardian of the rule of law and constitutional order. Through court orders, the judiciary ensures compliance with legal norms, protects fundamental rights, and maintains checks on executive and legislative excesses. However, when such orders are ignored, delayed, or poorly enforced, it undermines not only judicial authority but also the very foundation of democratic governance.

In Nigeria, weak enforcement of court orders has become a recurring concern. Despite clear constitutional mandates under Sections 6(6)(b) and 287(1)–(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), government agencies and officials frequently disregard judgments without facing consequences. This section evaluates the broader implications of this weakness for judicial integrity, rule of law, and governance in Nigeria.

Legal Basis for Enforcement of Court Orders

Under the Nigerian constitutional framework, all authorities and persons are obligated to obey court judgments:

Section 6(6)(b) vests judicial powers in the courts of law.

Section 287(1)–(3) expressly provides that decisions of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, and High Courts “shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons.”

The Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap S6 LFN 2004) and Judgment (Enforcement) Rules outline procedures for executing judgments.

These provisions reflect a fundamental constitutional intent that judicial pronouncements are binding and final, not advisory. In *Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu* (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 (SC), the Supreme Court warned that “disobedience of court orders is an invitation to anarchy.”

The Nature of Weak Enforcement in Nigeria

Weak enforcement manifests in various forms:

Outright disobedience of judgments by government agencies or public officials.

Administrative delays in processing enforcement documents or securing consent under Section 84(1) SCPA.

Selective compliance, where politically sensitive judgments are ignored while others are executed.

Institutional incapacity within court enforcement departments due to underfunding and poor logistics.

Judicial timidity in holding public officials in contempt due to procedural rigidity and political pressure.

This pervasive non-compliance undermines both the perception and reality of judicial effectiveness.

Impact on Judicial Authority

Erosion of Judicial Independence

A major consequence of weak enforcement is the erosion of judicial independence. When judgments are not obeyed, courts appear powerless and dependent on the goodwill of the executive to ensure compliance.

In *Nigerian Army v. Mowarin* (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 235) 345 (CA), the Court of Appeal condemned the failure of state actors to obey court orders, emphasizing that “the essence of the rule of law is that the government should be subject to the law.” Persistent disobedience, however, creates an impression that the judiciary is inferior to the executive.

Furthermore, reliance on the Attorney-General’s consent before garnishee proceedings (under Section 84(1) SCPA) subordinates the judiciary’s enforcement power to an executive officer, thereby violating the doctrine of separation of powers established in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Constitution.

Loss of Public Confidence in the Judiciary

Public trust in the judiciary is directly tied to its ability to enforce its decisions. When citizens see government officials disregard judgments with impunity, confidence in the legal system erodes.

According to the Open Justice Gavel Report (2021), “the routine disobedience of court orders in Nigeria has normalized impunity and diminished public faith in the courts.”

In *A.G. Federation v. Atiku Abubakar & 3 Ors* (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1 (SC), the Supreme Court emphasized that judicial authority derives its legitimacy from the people’s confidence that judgments will be respected and implemented. Weak enforcement thus strikes at the heart of democratic legitimacy.

Undermining the Doctrine of Separation of Powers

Effective governance in a democracy relies on balance and mutual respect among the three arms of government. When the executive or legislature disregards court orders, it distorts this constitutional equilibrium.

In *Lakanmi & Anor v. Attorney-General (Western State) & Ors* (1971) UILR 201, the Supreme Court (then in Western Nigeria) held that no branch of government is above the law. Yet, repeated disregard of judgments, especially in cases involving human rights, undermines judicial checks and gives undue dominance to the executive arm.

This imbalance weakens constitutionalism and fosters authoritarian tendencies.

Impact on Governance and Rule of Law

Promotion of Executive Impunity

Weak enforcement emboldens the executive to act outside the limits of the law. When court orders are ignored without repercussions, public officers begin to perceive themselves as above judicial scrutiny.

In *Ogunayo Olagunju v. Attorney-General of the Federation* (2021) FHC/L/CS/1029/2020, the Federal High Court decried the government’s refusal to comply with an order releasing unlawfully detained citizens, describing it as “a blatant abuse of constitutional authority.” Such disobedience reflects executive impunity that corrodes democratic accountability.

Weak Protection of Fundamental Rights

The judiciary serves as the last refuge of citizens against violations of fundamental rights. Weak enforcement renders court orders on fundamental rights enforcement (Chapter IV CFRN 1999) ineffective.

In many cases, even after courts award damages or order reinstatement of unlawfully dismissed workers, implementation remains stalled. The National Human Rights Commission’s Annual Report (2022) documented that over 60% of judgments in rights-based cases were either partially implemented or ignored by public authorities.

This failure erodes citizens’ faith in the judicial process and promotes self-help or vigilante justice.

Economic and Institutional Consequences

Judicial orders frequently involve commercial disputes, contract enforcement, or debt recovery. When judgments are not enforced, investors perceive Nigeria as a high-risk jurisdiction.

According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (2020), Nigeria ranked low in “Enforcing Contracts” largely due to weak implementation of judicial decisions. Non-enforcement of monetary judgments against

government agencies discourages foreign direct investment (FDI) and disrupts commercial confidence. The Supreme Court in *Central Bank of Nigeria v. Interstell Communications Ltd* (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 (SC) reiterated that government agencies are not immune from enforcement and must comply with final judgments. However, the recurring delays in payment of judgment debts contradict this principle, undermining economic justice.

Weak Democratic Accountability

Court orders often serve as tools to check unlawful legislative or executive actions. Failure to enforce such orders dilutes accountability mechanisms and allows corruption to thrive.

In *Fawehinmi v. Inspector-General of Police* (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 606 (SC), the Supreme Court affirmed that even the highest public officers are bound by the rule of law. Yet, persistent disregard for court directives allows illegal detentions, election malpractices, and abuse of power to continue unchecked.

Weak enforcement therefore corrodes transparency, perpetuates impunity, and erodes the moral legitimacy of governance.

Broader Socio-Political Effects

- **Encouragement of Civil Disobedience:** Citizens may begin to disregard laws and court judgments, mirroring the government's example.
- **Erosion of Justice Delivery:** The justice system loses deterrent power; litigants view judgments as worthless.
- **Judicial Frustration and Low Morale:** Judges become disillusioned when their decisions are ignored, leading to institutional apathy.
- **International Reputational Damage:** Nigeria's reputation for weak judicial enforcement affects treaty compliance, foreign investment, and human rights credibility before bodies like the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

Recommendations to Socio-Political Effects

- **Full Enforcement of Section 287 CFRN** — The National Judicial Council (NJC) should monitor compliance and publish annual reports on implementation.
- **Abolish Section 84(1) SCPA** Consent Requirement to prevent executive obstruction of garnishee proceedings.
- **Independent Judicial Enforcement Authority** Create a Judicial Enforcement Commission to execute judgments free from executive interference.
- **Criminalize Non-Compliance** Make willful disobedience of court orders by public officers an

offence punishable under the Criminal Code or Administrative Sanctions Act.

- **Judicial Funding Autonomy** Implement Sections 81(3) and 121(3) of the Constitution to ensure independent financial control.
- **Public Accountability** Legislators should demand periodic reports on compliance with judgments involving public institutions.
- **Civic Education** Public enlightenment campaigns to restore respect for judicial orders as part of democratic culture.

The weak enforcement of court orders in Nigeria constitutes one of the gravest threats to constitutionalism and good governance. It undermines judicial authority, erodes public trust, encourages executive impunity, and weakens democratic accountability.

As the Supreme Court warned in *Ojukwu's Case* (1986), disobedience to court orders invites anarchy. The rule of law a cardinal pillar of governance cannot thrive when judicial pronouncements are ignored. Strengthening enforcement mechanisms through legal reform, institutional independence, and civic education is therefore imperative to restore confidence in Nigeria's justice system and safeguard the nation's democratic future.

Proposed Institutional Reforms Aimed at Elevating the Authority and Enforcement of Court Orders within Nigeria's Tripartite Government System

In a constitutional democracy like Nigeria, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in maintaining the rule of law through the interpretation and enforcement of laws. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), particularly Sections 6(6)(b) and 287(1)(3), confers upon the courts the authority to make binding decisions which must be obeyed by all persons and authorities.

However, the recurrent disobedience of court orders by public officials and institutions has eroded public confidence in the judiciary and weakened the country's governance framework. For Nigeria to sustain constitutionalism, there must be deliberate institutional reforms that strengthen the authority and enforceability of judicial orders across the executive, legislative, and judicial arms of government.

Conceptual Foundation

Court orders are the instruments through which judicial decisions are actualized. They ensure that justice is not merely declared but implemented. When such orders are ignored or delayed, they lose their potency, and the judiciary becomes vulnerable to ridicule. The Supreme Court in *Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu* (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 (SC) described disobedience of court orders as "an invitation to anarchy."

Therefore, elevating the authority of court orders demands institutional, legal, and administrative changes to restore respect for judicial authority.

Existing Legal Framework and Its Weakness

Despite the clear constitutional directive in Section 287 CFRN, enforcement is largely undermined by:

- The Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap S6 LFN 2004) which requires Attorney-General's consent before execution against government funds (Section 84(1)).
- Procedural rigidity under the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules, which are outdated and bureaucratic.
- The absence of an independent enforcement mechanism, leaving courts dependent on the executive-controlled police and bailiffs.

In *Central Bank of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Ltd* (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 (SC), the apex court condemned executive interference in enforcement processes, emphasizing that "government agencies are not above the law."

These weaknesses necessitate a set of comprehensive institutional reforms.

Proposed Institutional Reforms

Establishment of a Judicial Enforcement Authority (JEA)

One of the most crucial reforms is the creation of an Independent Judicial Enforcement Authority under the supervision of the National Judicial Council (NJC).

- The JEA would be empowered to execute all court orders, judgments, and decrees without recourse to the executive.
- It should have its own enforcement officers, similar to the High Court Enforcement Officers in the United Kingdom.
- The JEA should be constitutionally backed through amendments to Sections 6 and 287 of the Constitution to provide for direct enforcement powers.
- This reform will eliminate executive interference and strengthen judicial autonomy.
- Amendment of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act

The requirement of the Attorney-General's consent before enforcing judgments against government accounts has become a tool of obstruction. The Supreme Court in *Onjewu v. Kogi State Ministry of Commerce* (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) 40 (CA) noted that this provision frustrates justice and undermines the rule of law.

Proposed amendment:

- Replace Attorney-General's consent with Judicial Oversight, allowing the presiding judge to approve garnishee orders directly.

- Create a Judgment Payment Account within the Treasury to settle verified court awards promptly.
- Strengthening Judicial Autonomy through Direct Funding
- Judicial independence, guaranteed under Sections 81(3) and 121(3) of the Constitution, must translate into financial autonomy.
- All funds for enforcement and judicial operations should be transferred directly from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to the judiciary.
- The Judiciary Financial Autonomy Implementation Committee (2021) should be institutionalized by law.
- Each court should have a Judgment Enforcement Department funded through this framework.

Without fiscal autonomy, the judiciary will remain dependent on the executive for enforcement logistics, thereby compromising impartiality.

Reform of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules

- The current enforcement procedures are outdated, having been modeled on 1950s British legal practices.

Reform should include:

- Digitalization of Enforcement e-filing, e-writs, and online tracking of execution.
- Time limits for execution of judgments to prevent unnecessary delays.
- Specialized enforcement divisions in every High Court to handle complex cases efficiently.

In *Eze v. Okechukwu* (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 348 (CA), the court underscored the need for efficiency in contempt and enforcement proceedings. Procedural modernization would significantly reduce delays.

Contempt Law Reform and Accountability Mechanisms

- The punishment for disobedience of court orders must be made more stringent:
- Enact a Judicial Compliance and Sanctions Act, criminalizing deliberate defiance of judicial orders by public officials.
- Mandate annual reporting by the NJC on government compliance with judgments.
- Empower courts to impose administrative fines and personal liability on officials who frustrate enforcement.

In *Nigerian Army v. Mowarin* (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 235) 345 (CA), the court held that no authority is above the law. However, without strict penalties, disobedience persists as a norm rather than an exception.

Legislative Oversight and Inter-Arm Collaboration

- The National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly must strengthen oversight functions on judicial compliance.

- Committees on Justice and Judiciary should conduct periodic reviews of court order implementation.
- The legislature should enact a Court Orders (Compliance and Accountability) Act mandating quarterly reports from Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) on judgments executed or pending.
- Joint Judicial-Executive-Legislative Councils should meet biannually to review compliance levels.

Such institutional coordination fosters mutual respect among the three arms and strengthens democratic accountability.

Judicial Capacity Building and Ethics

- Continuous training for judges, registrars, and enforcement officers is vital.
- Establish a Judicial Training Institute for Enforcement and Compliance Studies under the NJC.
- Introduce ethics modules to curb corruption, ensure diligence, and enhance professional standards.
- Performance evaluations should include compliance metrics to measure effectiveness.
- By enhancing professional competence, the judiciary can respond more robustly to enforcement challenges.

Public Awareness and Rule of Law Education

- Public ignorance about the binding nature of court orders contributes to societal apathy.
- The National Orientation Agency (NOA) and civil society organizations should promote awareness campaigns on the sanctity of judicial orders.
- Media advocacy should highlight cases of compliance and non-compliance to encourage transparency.
- Incorporate Rule of Law Education into civic studies curricula at secondary and tertiary levels.
- An informed citizenry will exert pressure on government officials to obey court decisions, thereby reinforcing accountability.

Expected Outcomes of Institutional Reforms

- The implementation of the above reforms will:
- Strengthen judicial authority and independence.
- Promote compliance culture within all arms of government.
- Restore public confidence in the justice system.
- Enhance foreign investment and economic stability through predictable rule of law.
- Reduce executive impunity and encourage accountability.
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- Ultimately, the reforms would institutionalize the supremacy of the law, ensuring that no individual or institution operates above judicial control.

The authority of court orders is central to the rule of law and democratic stability. Nigeria's governance system suffers when judicial decisions are disregarded by political actors. Institutional reforms including the establishment of a Judicial Enforcement Authority, amendment of Section 84 SCPA, enforcement of judicial financial autonomy, and modernization of enforcement procedures are vital to restoring judicial authority.

As the Supreme Court declared in *Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu* (1986), obedience to court orders is not optional but foundational to civil governance. Institutionalizing these reforms will ensure that Nigeria's judiciary is not merely a pronouncer of judgments but a true enforcer of justice.

Actionable Steps and Policy Initiatives to Improve Inter-Arm Coordination, Transparency, Accountability and Enforcement of Court Orders in Nigeria

Ensuring that court orders are respected and implemented by the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government is essential for the rule of law, separation of powers and good governance. The Constitution mandates enforcement of judicial decisions, yet practical gaps persist. Any reform package must therefore combine legal amendment, institutional redesign, procedural modernization and behavioural change across all three arms of government. Section 287 of the Constitution expressly requires that judicial decisions "shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons." (FAOLEX)

Overarching principles guiding reforms

- Constitutional fidelity reforms must strengthen the Constitution's command (Section 287) that court decisions be enforced without distinction. ([Nigerian Constitution])
- Judicial independence with administrative capacity courts must be independent yet possess the administrative tools and funding to ensure enforcement.
- Clear separation but practical coordination reforms should preserve separation of powers while creating lawful, institutionalized coordination mechanisms to achieve compliance.
- Transparency and public accountability enforcement processes must be transparent and subject to oversight to deter abuse.
- Proportionality and fairness enforcement measures must respect due process while being effective.
- Legal and statutory reforms (short-term & medium-term)

- Amend Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA)

Problem: The current requirement for the Attorney-General's prior consent before garnishee/attachment of funds controlled by public officers is frequently used to delay execution.

Actionable change: Amend Section 84(1) to replace blanket AG consent with a judicially-supervised verification step:

- Allow the court, upon proof of judgment and proper notice, to grant a conditional garnishee order subject to summary judicial review (e.g., within 7–14 days) of any claim of public interest or statutory immunity.
- Create fast-track procedures for judgments against public bodies, requiring the AG to file a written objection within a short statutory timeline, failing which enforcement proceeds.

Expected effect: Removes an administrative choke-point while preserving a short, transparent opportunity for genuine public-interest objections.

- Support: scholarly debate and recent case law on the consent requirement; Supreme Court guidance in *Interstella*/CBN decisions emphasise limits to the consent rule.
- Enact a Court Orders (Compliance & Enforcement) Act

Problem: Enforcement rules are scattered and often procedural; there is no modern statute that institutionalises compliance reporting, timelines and sanctions.

Actionable change: Parliament should enact a modern Court Orders (Compliance & Enforcement) Act that:

- Prescribes time limits for execution steps (e.g., writs issued within X days; sales/attachment within Y days).
- Makes deliberate non-compliance by public officials a statutory offence (with graduated sanctions: pecuniary penalty, suspension of office, referral to relevant anti-corruption body).
- Mandates a public Judgment Compliance Register (see below) maintained by the judiciary and accessible to the public.

Expected effect: Provides clear statutory teeth and predictable processes to deter delays and non-compliance.

Institutional reforms for inter-arm coordination

Create a Tripartite Compliance Forum (TCF)

Problem: Lack of routine institutional dialogue between courts, the executive and the legislature on systemic enforcement issues.

Actionable change: Establish a permanent Tripartite Compliance Forum a technical and policy body composed of:

- Senior judges (nominated by the National Judicial Council);
- Permanent Secretaries or Directors from key ministries (e.g., Finance, Justice, Interior);
- Legislative committee representatives (Justice Committees of the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly); and

Civil society/Bar Association observer members.

Mandate: Quarterly review of systemic enforcement backlogs, recommendations for immediate remedial action, and adoption of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for enforcement of orders against MDAs.

Governance safeguards: The TCF should only coordinate, not command; all enforcement action remains subject to judicial process. Minutes and compliance follow-ups should be publicly published.

Designate Court-Government Liaison Officers (CGLs)

Problem: Absence of a clear, accountable point of contact within MDAs for enforcement matters causes delay.

Actionable change: Each MDA and legislature should designate a Court-Government Liaison Officer (CGL) whose responsibilities include:

- Receiving enforcement notices and coordinating internal compliance steps;
- Acting as a single point of contact for enforcement officers;
- Submitting quarterly compliance returns to the judiciary and the TCF.

Accountability: Failure of CGLs to act promptly should be reportable to the head of the MDA and subject to administrative consequences.

- Establish an Inter-Arm Fast Response Protocol (IFRP)

Problem: Emergencies or sensitive judgments (e.g., injunctions halting state actions) require immediate multi-actor coordination.

Actionable change: The IFRP is a codified protocol that triggers a short emergency process (72 hours) involving the court registrars, CGL, and security agencies to ensure compliance or, where justified, seek an expedited stay. This protocol reduces ad-hoc, ad-hominem responses.

Transparency measures

Problem: Lack of public, searchable data on judgments, enforcement status and outstanding government liabilities.

Actionable change: The judiciary should publish and maintain an online National Judgment Compliance Register (NJCR) that records:

Case identifiers, parties, court and judgment date;

Nature of order;

- Enforcement actions taken with dates (e.g., writ issued, attachment, garnishee);

Whether the judgment is fully/partially satisfied or pending, and reasons for delay.

Legal basis & protection: Register entries must balance transparency with privacy and national security considerations; sensitive entries can be redacted on judicial order.

Expected effect: Public visibility exerts civic pressure on non-complying MDAs and aids oversight by legislators and auditors.

(This aligns with constitutional obligations under Section 287 and good governance practice.) ([Nigerian Constitution])

- Mandatory Public Reporting by MDAs

Problem: MDAs often do not disclose outstanding judgment liabilities or enforcement responses.

Actionable change: Require MDAs to include a Judgment Compliance Annex in their annual financial statements and parliamentary budget submissions showing:

- Number and values of judgments against them;
- Amounts paid in the fiscal year to satisfy judgments;
- Actions taken to enforce or appeal, with timelines.

Enforcement: Parliament's Appropriations and Public Accounts Committees should review these Annexes and summon accounting officers for unexplained delays.

- Accountability mechanisms
- Strengthen Use of Contempt and Personal Liability
- Problem: Contempt proceedings are underused or procedurally frustrated.

Actionable change:

Simplify committal procedures for willful executive non-compliance (e.g., allow judicial notice of persistent default where adequate notice was served).

- Where deliberate defiance by an identifiable official is proved, courts should be empowered (by statute) to register personal liability (fines or asset seizure) and to report the matter to anti-corruption agencies for complementary action.
- Create an expedited appeals window to prevent abuse and protect rights; procedural safeguards must remain.

Judicial support: Courts have historically affirmed that public officials are not immune from contempt see Ojukwu and other authorities condemning official disobedience. ([Nigeria])

- Parliamentary Oversight and Sanctions

Problem: Legislatures rarely impose sanctions on executive officers who flout court orders.

Actionable change: Legislative rules should permit:

- Formal findings of non-compliance by legislative oversight committees;
- Administrative sanctions (e.g., withholding of promotion, suspension) where recommendations are sustained;
- Referral to relevant disciplinary or anti-corruption bodies for investigation.

Checks and balances: This must be exercised transparently and only after due process so as not to undermine separation of powers.

- Capacity building, resourcing and process modernization
- Judicial enforcement funding & financial autonomy

Problem: Enforcement units are underfunded and dependent on the executive for logistics. ([Rev. Fr. Moses Orshio Adasu University])

Actionable change: Implement full budgetary autonomy for the judiciary (as intended by Sections 81(3) and 121(3) of the Constitution) and ring-fence funds expressly for enforcement activities (vehicles, personnel, IT systems). The NJC should publish an enforcement budget and expenditure reports.

Create a Judicial Enforcement Agency (JEA) or Professional Enforcement Corps

- Problem: No independent, professional enforcement body exists to execute civil judgments free from executive control.

Actionable change: Establish a Judicial Enforcement Agency (JEA) under statutory backing, staffed by trained enforcement officers (similar to High Court Enforcement Officers in other jurisdictions) who:

- Operate under judicial discipline and NJC oversight;
- Execute writs, carry out asset tracing, and liaise with banks and registries;
- Use standardised SOPs and digital case management.

Safeguards: JEA personnel should be subject to disciplinary rules, judicial oversight and audit.

This recommendation builds on academic proposals and comparative models that suggest independent enforcement reduces executive leverage.) ([SSRN])

- Digital case management and asset-tracing infrastructure
- Problem: Manual systems cause delay and loss of records.

Actionable change: Deploy a National Enforcement Management System (NEMS) that links courts, banks, land registries, corporate registries and MDAs to:

- Enable electronic writ issuance and service;
- Allow real-time tracking of enforcement steps;
- Support garnishee/attachment requests with automated checks;

- Provide dashboards for the NJCR and TCF.
- Data protection: Implement robust cybersecurity and privacy safeguards.
- Civic-facing initiatives to support compliance
- Public education campaigns

Problem: Low public awareness about the binding nature of court orders and how to demand compliance.

Actionable change: National campaigns (led by NJC, NOA, NBA and CSOs) to explain citizens' rights, enforcement mechanisms and how to use the NJCR. Publish "report cards" that highlight MDA compliance rates.

- Civil society and media partnerships

Problem: Lack of independent monitoring of enforcement.

Actionable change: Formalise partnerships with independent watchdogs to monitor compliance, publish investigative reports and support strategic public interest litigation where needed.

- Monitoring, evaluation and continuous improvement
- Performance indicators and public scorecards

Actionable change: The NJC and TCF should adopt measurable KPIs, for example:

% of final monetary judgments satisfied within 6 months;

- Average time from judgment to first enforcement step;
- Number of successful contempt proceedings against officials.
- Publish quarterly scorecards and annual performance reviews.
- Independent reviews & judicial audits

Actionable change: Commission independent, periodic audits (by the Auditor-General or an independent consultancy) of enforcement units and MDA compliance. Publish findings and require remedial action plans.

Safeguards to protect the separation of powers and human rights

All enforcement reforms must:

- Preserve judicial process and appeal rights;
- Avoid executive overreach into judicial decision-making;
- Ensure enforcement measures (e.g., asset seizure, committal) meet fair-trial standards and proportionality; and
- Provide accessible remedies to prevent misuse of enforcement tools for political ends.

Implementation roadmap (first 18 months)

- 0–3 months: Draft amendments to Section 84(1) SCPA and a model Court Orders (Compliance & Enforcement) Bill; establish the TCF interim secretariat. ([PLACNG][3])

- 3–9 months: Pilot the NJCR and designate CGLs in 10 pilot MDAs; begin digitalisation pilots in two High Courts.
- 9–15 months: Pass the Court Orders Act; create legal framework for JEA; enact budgetary measures for judicial enforcement funding.
- 15–18 months: Launch full NJCR, JEA pilot, and public education campaign; publish first compliance scorecards.

A credible, sustainable response to the enforcement deficit requires both legal reform and institutional innovation. By amending obstructive statutory provisions, creating clear coordination mechanisms (TCF and CGLs), building an independent enforcement capacity (JEA), deploying digital systems (NEMS/NJCR), and strengthening transparency and accountability, Nigeria can materially elevate the authority of court orders. These steps will restore public confidence, reduce impunity, and fortify the rule of law.

Effects (of weak authority of court orders

When court orders are not effectively enforced or are ignored by government arms, the following effects occur:

- Erosion of judicial credibility: When litigants win in court but cannot obtain compliance, the judiciary's role is weakened and its authority reduced.
- Undermining of the rule of law: The principle that no one is above the law is compromised when government bodies ignore court orders.
- Impaired separation of powers: The tripartite system is destabilised when the legislative or executive arms behave as if court orders do not bind them.
- Impunity and governance deficits: Government agencies may feel free to ignore decisions, leading to poor governance, corruption and lack of accountability.
- Reduced access to justice: For judgment creditors, the inability to enforce orders means justice is frustrated and remedies are hollow.
- Increased litigation costs and delays: Protracted enforcement processes cause delays, cost escalation and sometimes abandonment of claims.
- Public distrust Citizens' trust in courts, government and the overall legal system may decline when outcomes do not lead to real change.

Reform Strategies

- To elevate the authority of court orders within Nigeria's tripartite system, several institutional reforms are required:
- Strengthen enforcement units: The judiciary should ensure that enforcement or execution

- departments (such as the one in the FCT High Court) are decentralised, well-equipped, adequately staffed and properly funded. For example, decentralisation of the enforcement unit away from a single headquarters has been recommended. (kubanni.abu.edu.ng)
- Establish independent enforcement mechanisms: Consider creating an independent Task Force or statutory body within the judiciary that has authority to monitor and ensure execution of court orders, including those against government arms. This helps remove over-reliance on the executive. (Nigerian Journals Online)
- Inter-arm coordination protocols: Develop formal protocols between the judiciary, executive agencies and legislature for better compliance with court orders. This may include regular meetings, institutional oversight mechanisms, and reporting of compliance.
- Effective sanctions and incentives: Amend statutes so that sanctions for non-compliance by public officials are meaningful (e.g., administrative consequences, fines, contempt proceedings) and ensure these are applied. (Open Justice)
- Public awareness and transparency: Improve transparency of enforcement processes (publish schedules of attached property sale, register enforcement actions, publish compliance reports) so that accountability increases. (kubanni.abu.edu.ng)
- Training and capacity building: Training for judges, registrars, enforcement officers, lawyers and agency officials on enforcement procedures, best practices and roles of each participant in the enforcement chain.
- Technological and process improvements: Use of digital tracking systems for enforcement, case-management systems, electronic service of orders and monitoring of compliance, to reduce delay and bottlenecks.
- Political will and culture change: Ensure that all arms of government respect court orders as binding and legitimate, and that leadership promotes compliance culture of obedience to the judiciary must be reinforced.

Legislative reforms: Amend relevant laws (Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Judgment Enforcement Rules).

- to streamline enforcement, reduce undue stays of execution, prevent frivolous delays, and ensure that government agencies comply.
- Monitoring & evaluation: Create performance metrics and monitoring systems to assess whether court orders are being complied with,
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- and publish findings, so that reforms can be evaluated and adjusted.

Conclusion

The authority of court orders within Nigeria's tripartite system of government is critical to upholding the rule of law, maintaining separation of powers and ensuring effective governance. While the legal framework for enforcement exists, practical realities reveal significant institutional and procedural weaknesses that undermine compliance, particularly when government arms are involved. Without meaningful reforms, court orders risk becoming symbolic pronouncements rather than instruments of justice. The reforms suggested in this study provide a blueprint for strengthening enforcement mechanisms, inter-institutional coordination and accountability. By elevating the authority of court orders, Nigeria can reinforce the integrity of the judiciary, bolster public confidence in governance and ensure that the rule of law prevails across all levels of government.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

1. The judiciary should decentralise enforcement units (e.g., state and local level enforcement teams) to reduce delays and costs.
2. A statutory independent enforcement body or task force should be established to monitor execution of court orders, ensure compliance by government arms and report publicly on enforcement status.
3. The executive and legislative arms of government should adopt compliance protocols, designate liaison officers for enforcement matters and ensure that court orders directed at them are promptly implemented.
4. The National Assembly and state legislatures should amend relevant enforcement statutes to strengthen sanctions for non-compliance, close procedural loopholes, and limit unwarranted stays of execution.
5. Training programmes should be instituted for judges, registrars, enforcement officers, lawyers and governmental agency officials on best practices for enforcement of court decisions.
6. Technological systems should be adopted by enforcement departments (court registrars, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, bailiffs) for case tracking, asset tracing, electronic service, real-time reporting and transparency.
7. Government agencies should include compliance with court orders as part of performance evaluation for senior officials and adopt internal audit units to monitor enforcement of judgments that involve the agencies.
8. Civil society organisations, bar associations and media should publish periodic enforcement

reports and highlight cases of non-compliance by government entities to raise public awareness and pressure for compliance.

9. The judiciary should publish annual compliance reports showing the number of court orders issued, the number enforced, those pending enforcement and the roles of the government arms in those processes.
10. A review mechanism (committee or commission) should periodically evaluate enforcement bottlenecks, recommend adjustments to the legal and procedural framework and ensure continuous improvement of the enforcement regime.

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